Live Q&As

Ayman al Zawahiri, AQ's number 2, will no doubt take over the leadership of the core AQ.  He is ideologically committed to AQ's agenda, has been a vocal spokesperson for the movement over the years (especially recently in the wake of the Arab Spring), and has driven AQ's operational and strategic direction for some time.  That said, Zawahiri lacks the charisma and recognized likeability and mythology of UBL for the broader Sunni extremist movement.  A key question will be whether Zawahiri can galvanize the movement at this critical moment or if he will preside over the further splintering of AQ and its relevant platforms around the world.

Also, keep in mind that there are a cadre of committed AQ Core and related leaders who remain intent on attacking US interests and those of our allies.  Though AQ will suffer with the loss of UBL, this does not mean the group and its membership no longer present a danger.

I think the death of UBL is a strategically important moment and closes a key chapter in the war on terror/AQ.  One cannot imagine the end of AQ-led terrorism without first ridding the scene of UBL.  There will be some who will be outraged or even inspired to act in the wake of UBL's death.  We need to remain vigilant.  That said, I think most of the world will breathe a sigh of relief in the hopes that this act will deflate the power, reach, and allure of the AQ movement.  UBL was losing popularity already, and many in Muslim communities around the world were alreaedy questioning the moral, theological, and strategic legitimacy of this movement.  This is not a moment to be afraid, but to take the strategic advantage of the loss of AQ's symbolic and strategic leader.

This is a good question.  I think AQ is at a strategic crossroads -- now with the loss of its leader but also because it is struggling to remain relevant in the wake of the Arab Spring.  AQ is banking on breathing space for its operatives and the inevitable disillusionment and discontent coming out of the revolutions to reignite its relevance (at least in the Arab world).  AQ could either begin its fade into ultimate decline or adapt via its regional organizations (as in Yemen and North Africa) to reassert itself.  There may be some violent jihadis who take inspiration and rage from the death of UBL, but there are others who are likely to see that UBL is no longer an untouchable ghost beyond the reach of America's power.  The demise of UBL may resonate deeply for years to come.

I agree that AQ has morphed over time.  The AQ of 2011 is not the same as the one we encountered on 9/11.  I call it the AQ Hydra now -- with multiple heads to include the AQ Core in Pakistan and Afghanistan; its affiliates in places like Yemen, Central Asia, and North Africa; and those inspired by AQ who may not be affiliated officially (e.g., lone wolves).  The death of UBL won't rid the world of the threat from this Hydra, but it does close an important chapter in the war on terror by depriving the broader global movement of its founder and chief strategist.  Recall that it was UBL who innovated the notion of targeting the "far enemy" (US and the West) and the obligation of "defensive jihad" to defend fellow Muslims against the West's purported war on Islam.  Without UBL as the critical centerpiece for this movement, the broader AQ franchises and elements could fracture and begin to reshape their focus again on local issues (as was seen prior to the rise of AQ in the mid 1990s).  Though the terrorist threat doesn't go away tomorrow as a result of this action, the loss of UBL is a major step in constraining the operational and ideological reach of this movement.

The U.S. government has already begun to take precautionary steps to ensure our defenses are up against possible reprisals.  The State Department has issued warnings to American travelers, it has increased our security posture at Embassies and consulates around the world, and the homeland security and counter-terrorism communities are scouring for any information pointing to an attack.  President Obama has spoken about this concern, and I can guarantee you that he and the CT/national security community are doing everything possible to protect American lives, property, and our allies.  They want to ensure that AQ gains no benefit from the death of UBL.

The relationship between the United States and Pakistan on counterterrorism is critical, but it is under a great deal of stress.  That relationship has led to real success in the past, but it has never been a perfect relationship by any stretch.  There have been times of deep tension between the intelligence and military services of each country, but this has become a critical time of deepening distrust -- in particular in the wake of the Raymond Davis affair. 

In this particular case, President Obama was clear.  This was an American operation without Pakistani involvement and with no pre-notification to their leadership.  The phone calls to President Zardari and others happened after the fact.  This signals both the great sensitivity of the operation but also a serious level of distrust with the Pakistanis.  Certainly, the Pakistanis will have to answer some tough questions as to why UBL was housed in a villa in Abbottabad, a settled part of Pakistan with plenty of Pak military and intelligence presence.  Bad intelligence, willful blindness, or complicity -- or some combination thereof -- may be to blame.  None of these is a good answer, which gives the United States some leverage now to repair the relationship on our terms and to push the Pakistani government to do more to root out AQ and Taleban leadership in their midst.

This question is near and dear to my hear given my prior role at the Treasury to help run the campaign against terrorist financing after 9/11.  In general, AQ has been hurting for its finances -- which has reduced its ability to influence its regional membership and to train as aggressively and widely as it would like.  It is harder, costlier, and riskier today for AQ and its allies to raise and move money around the world due to measures taken.

As a result, AQ has had to share operatives and blend training as a result, while regional groups have had to adapt to other ways of making money for themselves (see, e.g., ransoms for hostages taken by al Qaida in the Islamic Magreb and drug trafficking by the same group).  The loss of UBL will affect AQ's finances, in part since his leadership has galvanized deep-pocket donors in the past.  With his passing, these demanding "investors" for AQ will hold back to see what happens next and may decide to support other causes of import, with no AQ nexus.  In general, the loss of UBL will hurt AQ's ability to fundraise in the long term, while the US and its allies continue to shut down the means by which terrorist groups raise and move money.

I don't think there is any direct relationship between the two, in part since it has been reported that Raymond Davis was assigned to gather information about Lashkar e Tayyiba (vice hunting for UBL).  That said, the presence of Raymond Davis and others from the U.S. intelligence community in Pakistan underscores the steps the USG has been taking to gather information on terrorist groups and networks in Pakistan.  This revelation and the entire Davis affair has also acutely strained relations between the two countries' intelligence communities.

The response from other countries seems very positive at the news of UBL's death -- with the US being applauded by its allies.   There is no love lost for UBL around the world -- where he has slaughtered innocents from Africa to the Middle East to North America -- so that is reflected in official reactions from around the world.

There are some sympathies in pockets of populations around the world, where UBL has been lionized as a courageous revolutionary facing down the great superpower.  We may begin to see statements decrying this action -- via the Internet and otherwise -- from voices of those populations or groups.

Many of the official messages are sober in warning that this will not mean the end of terrorism.  

I don't think we've seen or heard anything about a specific threat.  I think authorities are worried more broadly about the likelihood of some violent retribution/reaction to the death of UBL -- who has served as an inspirational figure for violent extremists around the world.  Keep tuned to what the Department of Homeland Security puts out via its new national warning system.  They'll be sensitive to how they use this for the first time.

Great point.  No doubt our special forces engaged in "sensitive site exploitation" -- meaning that they scoured the villa for documents, computers, files, receipts, and anything else of value.  They likely also spoke to those who were alive, gathering information about the inhabitants, visitors, and the villa.  They are likely doing everything possible now to gather data from whatever they grabbed during the search and hopefully are exploiting it to follow up any relevant leads.  This is a process that our special forces community honed in Iraq and have perfected in Afghanistan -- often with the help of law enforcement and intelligence professionals.

Under both the Bush and Obama Administrations, the U.S. has declared that it is at war with AQ and has the right to self defense.  This means that it can kill or capture enemy leadership, in accordance with Congress' authorization for the use of military force in 2001 and the principles of self defense ensconced in international law and the UN Charter.  The Obama Administration has vigorously defended this principle in the context of the use of lethal force, and this episode is precisely why.  Some may argue that this appears to be an unlawful extrajudicial killing, but if you accept that we are operating under war-time principles and legal constructs, then the killing of the head of AQ is not only permissible but it's legal under international law.